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Abstract. This paper analyzes the mark-up of the price of a product over marginal costs 
for a monopolist using Appelbaum’s theoretical model. The profit maximization model of 
an industry that uses the monopolist’s product as its input is formulated. Our goal is to 
express the monopolist’s mark-up as a function of the elasticity of substitution for the 
respective industry and to analyze how changes in the elasticity of substitution affect the 
mark-up ratio. Consequently, the CES production function along with its substitution 
parameter is chosen. An analytical description of changes in the elasticity of substitution 
and its influence on the monopolist's mark-up is given. All scenarios are supplemented by 
geometrical illustrations, economic interpretations and numerical examples. 
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Identifying and measuring market power in product markets has drawn the 
attention of numerous economists, due to the influence of market power on overall 
economic performance [4,9]. The most direct indicator of monopoly power is the 
mark-up ratio, which is defined as the ratio of difference between the price and a 
firm’s marginal cost to price, known in literature as the Lerner index [7]. Since 
marginal costs are not directly observable, empirical measuring them empirically 
is relatively difficult. A new methodology in estimating the mark-up of prices over 
marginal costs at an aggregate level was devised in the late 1980-s [6] and uses 
the Solow residual. Due to some criticism of Hall’s approach to its empirical 
application, Roeger modified Hall’s original method [8].  
Appelbaum [1] in his analysis, unlike other studies in which the degree of mono-
poly is measured, offers a framework for testing the price using a behavioral hypo-
thesis for the industry and applying it to the U.S. crude petroleum and natural 
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gas industry. This framework for analyzing a non-competitive industry or firm is 
the basis for our paper. The mark-up of product price over marginal costs as a 
direct indicator of imperfect competition is analyzed using a theoretical model to 
formulate the profit maximization model of an industry that uses the monopolist’s 
product as its input. The industry’s technology is described by the CES produ-
ction function and is chosen given the existence of the substitution parameter, 
which in turn is used in calculating the elasticity of substitution and measures the 
ease of substitution between the monopolist’s input and other inputs of the 
respective industry. The solution of the necessary first-order conditions for the 
industry’s profit maximization model yields the demand function for the 
monopolist’s product. The next step involves using a derived demand function 
and solving a monopolist’s profit maximization model. The goal of this paper is 
to express the monopolist’s mark-up as a function of the industry’s elasticity of 
substitution and to analyze how changes in the elasticity of substitution affect 
the mark-up ratio. 
In practice, this model is applicable to many industries. For instance, one such 
industry is the graphite lead industry, where graphite pencils initially used pure 
graphite for the lead which was very expensive, resulting in low volumes manufa-
ctured. This will be later explained relying on the lower boundary of the elasticity 
of substitution between inputs. Once pure graphite was replaced with cheaper 
unclean graphite and mixed with clay, both of which are abundantly available, 
demand for pure graphite fell and in time the graphite monopoly collapsed as did 
its producer. This again will be  explained later using the upper boundary of the 
elasticity of substitution. 
 
2. The monopolist's mark-up 
 
Let’s analyze first an industry and suppose that its technology is represented by 
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function,  
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where 0y  and x  are quantities of inputs used in the production process by an 
industry,   is the distribution parameter,   is the scale parameter and   is the 
substitution parameter. Let’s assume that one of the inputs the industry uses is 
produced by a monopolist and the quantity is represented by 0y  and x  is the 
vector of other inputs used in the production process of an industry. 
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An industry maximizes profit by choosing optimal quantities of inputs subject to 
given prices of inputs and the profit maximization model of an industry is 
formulated as [1]: 
 
                                
0
0 0 0 0,
max ( , )
y
w G y p y 
x
x wx ,              (2) 
 
where 0w  is the price of an industry product, 0p  is the monopolist’s product 
price and w  is the vector of other input prices. By differentiating the goal 
function with respect to the decision variables, the first-order necessary conditions 
are obtained,  
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and the solution to the system of equations gives the demand functions for inputs, 
0 0 0( ), ( )y p px . We suppose that the second-order sufficient conditions are 
satisfied. 
Given that we have chosen the CES production function, the profit maximization 
model of an industry is defined as 
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where we assume, without the loss of generality, that the industry, in addition to 
the monopolist’s product as input employs one more input where the quantity is 
represented by x, and price is represented by w. By differentiating the goal 
function in (4) with respect to the quantities of inputs, the following system of 
equations is obtained. The solutions are the demand functions for the monopolist’s 
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Due to functional form of the chosen CES production function, the computation 
is somewhat tedious, hence it will be presented further on in the paper. 









Our interest in this paper is to obtain the demand function for the monopolist’s 
product and incorporate it into the monopolist’s profit maximization model in 
order to express the mark-up of monopolist’s product price over marginal cost as 
a function of the elasticity of substitution. 
The next step in deriving the demand function for the monopolist’s product 
involves inserting (6) into the first equation of (5), and hence obtain the demand 
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Let’s now focus on the monopolist’s profit maximization model. We chose to take 
the monopolist’s product price as his decision variable instead of the output 
quantity, hence the monopolist’s profit maximization problem is formulated as 
follows: 
 




 ,                         (10) 
 
where 0p  is the monopolist’s product price, )( 00 py  is the industry’s demand 
function for the monopolist’s product and  )(,, 0021 pyppc  is the cost function 
which describes monopolist’s technology, and depends on the price of inputs that 
the monopolist uses in his production process, 21, pp , and the given level of 
production, here expressed as a function of price, )( 00 py . 
By differentiating the goal function with respect to the decision variable, the first 
order necessary condition is obtained: 
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where we observe a deviation of the monopolist’s product price from the marginal 
cost, which is the mark-up and is given by the expression within the brackets. 
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Let’s now assume that the monopolist’s technology is represented by the Cobb-
Douglas production function,  
 
                    (12) 
 
where 0y  is the monopolist’s output quantity, ),( 21 yyF  is the production 
function describing the monopolist’s technology, and 1y , 2y  are input quantities 
that the monopolist employs in the production process.  
Given that our chosen decision variable in the monopolist’s profit maximization 
model is the product price, from which the product quantity can be easily obtained 
just by inserting the optimal product price into the demand function for the 
monopolist’s product, the starting function representing the monopolist’s 
technology has to be the cost function instead of the production function. From 
the duality theory in microeconomics, we know that the cost function represents 
technology as the production function equally well [2,3,5].  
The cost function is derived from the model of cost minimization subject to the 





Base on microeconomic theory, first-order necessary conditions describe economic 















. In our case, economic efficiency is represent-
ted by the following equality,  
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By inserting it in the constraint in (13), the conditional input demand functions 
are obtained,  
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Finally, by inserting the derived input demand functions in the goal function of 
(13), the monopolist’s cost function is obtained 
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Now, let’s go back to the equation (11) and express the first-order necessary 
condition for the monopolist’s profit maximization model in our case. The 













what gives us 
 
      
 (1 )
1 1 11 ( 1)( )
1 1 11 ( )1 2 0 0 0 01 2 1 ( )
0
0
, , ( )
(19).
1
c p p y p p pp p ww
y
   
              
  
    
  
   
     
 
                                      
 
 
Now we are in the position to discuss how the monopolist’s mark-up depends on 
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3. Monopolist’s mark-up and the elasticity of substitution 
 
The elasticity of substitution measures the ease of substitution between the 
production factors due to their price changes. It is the elasticity of the input 
quantities ratio with respect to the marginal rate of technical substitution,  
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The industry’s CES production function is characterized by the constant elasticity 
of substitution which is shown below. The marginal rate of technical substitution 
is expressed as a function of the input quantities ratio,  
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from which it can be concluded that the elasticity of substitution is determined 
by the substitution parameter  , 
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Below we will show how the monopolist’s mark-up ratio changes when the 
substitutability of an industry’s inputs 0y  and x , measured by the elasticity of 
substitution, changes in a few scenarios. For this purpose, let’s assume that the 
price of an output in a perfectly competitive industry is 100, 0 100w  , the other 
industry’s input price is 10, 10w  , and both prices of the monopolist’s inputs 
are equal to 1, 1 2 1p p  . Let the scale parameter in the industry's production 
function be 0.5, 0.5  , thus assuming decreasing returns to scale. Let the 
distribution parameter be equal to 0.5. To represent the monopolist's technology, 
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we assume that the parameters in the monopolist's Cobb-Douglas production 
function,   and  , representing the elasticities of output with respect to each 
input, are each equal to 0.25. Since the elasticity of scale is equal to the sum of 
these elasticities, we thus also assume that there are decreasing returns to scale 
in the monopolist's technology.  
 
3.1. Numerical illustrations 
 
Let the elasticity of substitution be 1.5, .5,1  The substitution parameter is 
then equal to .
3
1
 By inserting all given data in the already derived results for the 
monopolist’s demand function in (9), we get the following expression for the 
monopolist’s demand function 
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Combining it with the first order necessary condition for the monopolist’s profit 
maximization problem given in (11) and with the expression for the marginal cost 





we get the following results: the monopolist’s produced quantity is equal to 2.003, 
0 2.003,y  and the optimal product price is equal to 19.308, 0 19.308.p   The 
marginal cost is equal to 8.012. Therefore, the mark-up of price over marginal cost 
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The main interest in this paper was to show how the monopolist’s mark-up ratio 
changes as the elasticity of substitution changes. Different values of the elasticity 
of substitution and the corresponding mark-up ratios are given in the Table 1. 
 
  0y  0p  MC (marginal cost) Mark-up Lerner index 
1.5 2.003 19.308 8.012 11.296 58.51% 
2 2.137 17.100 8.550 8.550 50.00% 
3 2.304 14.692 9.217 5.475 37.27% 
4 2.386 13.489 9.546 3.943 29.23% 
5 2.430 12.777 9.722 3.056 23.91% 
6 2.456 12.308 9.824 2.484 20.18% 
Table 1: The influence of the elasticity of substitution on the monopolist’s mark-up ratio 
 
As can be seen from the table, the greater the elasticity of substitution, in other 
words, the greater the ease with which the industry can substitute inputs, one of 
which is the produced by a monopolist, the lower the monopolist’s mark-up ratio. 
As the elasticity of substitution becomes greater, the monopolist’s price is closer 
to the marginal cost of production. The dependence of the monopolist’s product 
price, the marginal cost of production and mark-up on the elasticity of 
substitution is illustrated in Figure 1. One can also notice that σ lies within a 
certain range, within which no solution was found. The minimum elasticity of 
substitution is affected by the industry’s price w, which does not allow the 
monopolist to undertake extortionate pricing. On the other hand, high substitu-
tability of the monopolistic input with an input x causes monopolist’s demand to 
fall below its average cost causing the monopolist to go bankrupt. After that 
point, this model no longer exists since the monopolist has disappeared.   
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Figure 1: The monopolist’s product price, the marginal cost, and the monopolist’s mark-
up as a function of the elasticity of substitution 
 
Figure 1 clearly shows that the greater the elasticity of substitution, the lower the 
monopolist’s mark-up and the price and marginal cost are closer to each other.  
Knowing that the elasticity of substitution is related to the curvature of the isoqu-
ant, in other words, the greater the elasticity of substitution, the less curved the 
isoquant is, allows us to illustrate below how the choice of the monopolist’s 
product and other input by an industry changes with a change to the elasticity 
of substitution for a cost minimization problem. It is also obvious that the greater 
the elasticity of substitution, the flatter the expansion path, leaning towards a 
perfectly competitive input.  
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In this paper, the mark-up of product price over marginal costs for the monopolist 
was analyzed using Appelbaum’s theoretical model. The profit maximization mo-
del of an industry which uses the monopolist’s product as its input was formula-
ted. Our goal was to express the monopolist’s mark-up as a function of the 
industry’s elasticity of substitution and to analyze how changes in the elasticity 
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of substitution affect the mark-up ratio. Consequently, in representing the 
industry’s technology, the CES production function was chosen with its substitu-
tion parameter used in the elasticity of substitution calculation.  
The first task was to solve the industry’s profit maximization model, where solute-
on of the first-order necessary conditions yields the demand function for the 
monopolist’s product. The next step involved using the derived demand function 
for the monopolist and solving the profit maximization model so as to express the 
mark-up of product price over marginal cost of a monopolist as a function of the 
elasticity of substitution. We showed for a number of numerical examples that 
the greater the elasticity of substitution, the lower the monopolist’s mark-up ratio. 
This is so because the elasticity of substitution measures the ease with which the 
industry can substitute inputs, one of which is produced by a monopolist. As the 
elasticity of substitution becomes greater, the monopolist’s price is closer to his 
marginal cost of production.  
There exists a range of the elasticity of substitution beyond which the model does 
not provide a solution; the minimum being determined by the industry’s selling 
price which has to justify the monopolist’s high mark-up and the maximum 
determined by the substitutability of the monopolistic input which would render 
the monopolist unnecessary. In this paper, these boundaries were approximated 
using numerical methods, but in subsequent research, a simpler version of the 
model will be used in an endeavor to find functional relations and the domain of 
the Lerner index as a function of the elasticity of substitution between 
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